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Agricultural Conservation Policy at
a Crossroads
Ralph E. Heimlich and Roger Claassen
U.S. agricultural conservation policy has focused on a range of potential policy instruments
centered on voluntary approaches tied into Depression-era commodhy programs. Entering the
twenty-first century, conservation policy is at a crossroads between more coercive regulatory
policies, more costly voluntary programs, and more facilitative market-oriented policies. What
are the pitfatls, advantages, disadvantages, and tradeoffs along these paths?
As we approach the twenty-first century, agricul-
tural conservation programs are at a crossroads be-
cause of changes in the key factors that have un-
dergirded conservation programs since their estab-
lishment in 1935 and new forces that call for new
approaches. In the first section of this paper, we
define the conservation problem, recognizing that
(1) distributional considerations have been histori-
cally important in agricultural policy, and (2) in-
formation limitations may preclude the develop-
ment of efficient solutions. Next, we review the
history of conservation and environmental policy
in agriculture and present a systematic taxonomy
of policy instruments used in agriculture, Finally,
we discuss the changes that have brought conser-
vation policy to a crossroads, considering the im-
plications of three divergent policy paths.
The Conservation Policy Problem
Conservation problems associated with agricul-
tural production generally involve damages to
natural resources and to natural resource users that
are not completely accounted for in the farm’s eco-
nomic calculus. While a conceptual distinction can
be made between resource problems that are inter-
nally accounted for by the farmer (conservation
problems) and those that impose externalities on
others (environmental problems), most examples
encountered in reality have impacts both on and off
the farm. Typical examples include depletion of
soil resources through erosion, pollution of water
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resources from runoff or leaching of sediments,
nutrients, or pesticides, and destruction of wildlife
habitat. The resulting depletion or contamination
damages some or all members of the society, cre-
ating an unpriced externality of production (Bau-
mol and Oates 1988, p, 36). The social problem is,
therefore, to influence producers to modify their
production practices to reduce or eliminate the
damages created.
Dimensions of space and time pervade conser-
vation and environmental problems because the lo-
cus of damage is frequently away (downwind or
downstream) from the farm; other damages from
production today may not be felt for many years.
Conservation and environmental problems may oc-
cur on the intensive or extensive margins of pro-
duction (Opaluch and Segerson 1991). Extensive
margin problems are associated with decisions to
farm, or not to farm, land of certain kinds or in
certain locations. Examples include crop produc-
tion on highly erodible soils, conversion of wet-
lands for crop production, and livestock production
upwind of human population concentrations (Ri-
baudo 1986; Young and Osborn 1990; Heimlich
and Langner 1986; Piper 1989), For intensive mar-
gin problems it is assumed that production will
take place; the concern is with how production is
carried out. Examples include the choice of tillage
systems to control soil erosion, the rate and timing
of fertilizer applications related to leaching or run-
off, and risks of ground and surface water contami-
nation by pesticides (Crosson 1981; Epp and Ham-
lett 1996; Huang et al. 1994). Over the past sixty
years, U.S. conservation and environmental poli-
cies have addressed both extensive and intensive
margin problems using a wide variety of programs
and practices (Rasmussen 1982; Magleby et al,
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Two considerations are key to conservation
policy: the limitations imposed by imperfect infor-
mation and the varying distributional impacts con-
servation policies have on producers. Because of
the diversity of physical and production circum-
stances under which farming takes place, and be-
cause of the variety of landscape situations in
which farms are located. conservation and environ-
mental problems associated with agriculture are
characterized by imperfect knowledge on the part
of both producers and environmental officials.
There are few direct linkages between production
practices and environmental outcomes, and myriad
paths of fate and transport intervene between
eroded soil, applied chemicals, and ecosystems and
human populations potentially damaged by them.
Direct monitoring is fraught with numerous uncer-
tainties caused by the stochastic nature of weather
events that influence the fate and transport of pol-
lutants and the extent and nature of natural areas.
Process models may give some indication of envi-
ronmental performance, but they are limited by the
need for calibration to specific situations and our
inability to trace relationships beyond the farm
with any confidence (Williams, Jones, and Dyke
1984; Arnold et al. 1995; Knisel 1980).
Most economic analyses of agricultural conser-
vation or environmental problems begin with the
assumption that efficiency is an overriding goal in
designing policies and programs (Baumol and
Oates 1988, ch, 15). As we show below, conser-
vation and environmental problems have evolved
from prior problems of managing farm income,
agricultural production, and the agricultural
economy. Consequently, policymakers are often
concerned with the division of costs and benefits
from programs between farm and nonfarrn sectors,
and between regions and commodities within the
farm sector.
Gardner (1987) analyzes U.S. farm policy using
a policy preference function that allows for varia-
tion in the weight placed on the economic interests
of various groups within society. Because distribu-
tional impacts are such an important factor in con-
servation policy, economists need to expand on
Gardner’s approach in two ways, First, we need to
consider how the distribution of welfare effects
from environmental policies, particularly within
agriculture, can be incorporated. Second, we need
to explicitly incorporate environmental objectives.
Evolution of Agricultural
Conservation Programs
Agricultural conservation and environmental poli-
cies operating at both extensive and intensive mar-
gins have always been closely tied to farm income
objectives and have always served the distribu-
tional goals of farm policy. Low farm income was
the key issue addressed when New Deal farm pro-
grams began in the 1930s (Luzar 1988). The Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA) was the
nation’s first attempt at controlling commodity
supplies to increase prices and incomes through a
linked policy of processor taxes intended to fund
paid land diversions for eligible farmers who re-
duced planted acreages of soil depleting crops
(Gaus, Wolcott, and Lewis 1940, p. 150). On Oc-
tober 25, 1935, President Roosevelt stated that the
program served two principal objectives:
First,to carryout the declaredpolicyof Congressto
maintain and increase the gains [in controlling com-
modity supply] thus far made. . . . Second,. . .to give
farmersincreasingincentivesforconservationandef-
ficient use of the Nation’s soil resources.(Cited in
Gaus,Wolcott,and Lewis 1940,p. 144)
The soil conservation aspects became critical when
the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the AAA and
the administration shifted emphasis to funding for
acreage retirement and soil conservation payments
from the general treasury; this shift was embodied
in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment
Act of 1936 (Benedict 1953, p. 349). Economists
favoring Pigouvian taxes as the most efficient way
to achieve policy objectives should note that in
U.S. v. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills
Corporation, 297 U.S. 1(1936) the Supreme Court
argued that processing taxes required under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act were unconstitutional
because the avowed purpose was regulatory, rather
than to raise revenue, and because the exercise of
the taxing power was for a purpose not delegated
to the federal government in the Constitution.
Thereafter, until 1985, participation in conser-
vation programs was strictly voluntary. Policymak-
ers relied on positive incentives to achieve conser-
vation objectives, so that programs benefited both
the environment and the particular producers who
participated in them (Reichelderfer 1991). Ex-
amples include conservation technical assistance,
land improvement cost-share programs (e.g., the
Agricultural Conservation Program and the Great
Plains Conservation Program), and land retirement
(e.g., the Soil Bank Program and the Conservation
Reserve Program). Policies were intended to meet
both conservation and farm income objectives, of-
ten with farm income as a primary objective,
through supply control for specific commodities
(Batie 1984). Land retirement programs legislated
during periods of agricultural recession had ex-
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been better funded than programs that exclusively
promoted conservation,
In the 1970s the environmental movement fo-
cused attention broadly on pollution and associated
environmental degradation and health effects (Un-
ger 1979; Magleby et al. 1995). Environmental
regulation of agriculture occurred only outside the
bounds of traditional commodity and conservation
policies. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act of 1972 banned or restricted the
use of a number of agricultural pesticides. The En-
dangered Species Act approved in 1973 had poten-
tially significant impacts for agriculture (Goldstein
1996). Although these programs carry no explicit
farm income objective, Reichelderfer (1991) ar-
gues that these and other major environmental laws
affecting agriculture were more likely to be ap-
proved during periods of relative prosperity for the
farm sector.
The agricultural export boom of the early 1970s
led to abandonment of conservation practices that
reduced the efficiency of farming operations and
expansion of cropland acreage. Although these de-
velopments renewed concern about the long-term
loss of agricultural productivity and provoked con-
cern about agriculture’s impact on the environ-
ment, the 1977 and 1981 farm bills focused on
providing price and income support to producers,
They broke little new ground on conservation or
environmental protection, with the exception of
provisions of the Farmland Protection Policy Act
of 1981.
The incipient agricultural recession in the mid
1980s set the stage for the Food Security Act
(FSA) of 1985 to usher in a new era in agricultural
and environmental policy. The Conservation Re-
serve Program continued the tradition of land re-
tirement programs undertaken for dual conserva-
tion and farm income support purposes. However,
for the first time eligibility was targeted to highly
erodible land. The definition of highly erodible
land was expanded to include traditional clients of
farm policy (Heimlich and Bills 1986), In another
first, farm commodity program benefits were tied
to environmental performance under the conserva-
tion compliance, sodbuster, and swampbuster pro-
visions of the FSA. Unlike previous, strictly vol-
untary programs, the new legislation forced pro-
ducers to weigh the costs of complying with
conservation programs against the loss of farm
program benefits. The 1985 act also completed a
shift (begun in the 1970s) from price support to
income support as a mechanism of redistributing
income to commodity producers.
In the latter half of the 1980s, market prices
declined sharply. Farmers needed to participate in
farm programs to survive financially and direct in-
come payments ballooned, creating strong incen-
tives to meet environmental standards. These in-
centives still depended on Congressional willing-
ness to provide significant federal support for farm
income. Producer incentives were most significant
during periods of low commodity prices, when
market incentives to convert highly erodible land
or wetland to crop production were low and pro-
ducer needs for income support were great.
Although the 1985 FSA embodied major
changes in mechanisms for accomplishing conser-
vation policy objectives, policy continued to focus
primarily on maintaining soil productivity, with the
notable exception of swampbuster provisions
(Zinn 1991). The 1990 Food Agriculture, Conser-
vation, and Trade Act (FACTA) significantly
broadened the environmental policy objectives of
agricultural policies. The objectives of the Conser-
vation Reserve Program were broadened to include
water quality and wildlife habitat, in addition to the
traditional supply management and soil productiv-
ity objectives. A new Wetlands Reserve Program
(WRP) was enacted, authorizing USDA to obtain
permanent easements and restore wetlands on
former cropland.
Finally, the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization
Amendments (CZARA) of 1990 required, for the
first time, an explicitly regulatory approach to ag-
ricultural nonpoint source pollution (Heimlich and
Barnard 1995). CZARA requires that ‘‘economi-
cally achievable” agricultural nonpoint source pol-
lution control measures be implemented by states
in coastal zones, including the Great Lakes.
CZARA standards are technology-based. No direct
cause-and-effect linkage between observed water
quality conditions is needed for a state to require
implementation of specific management measures.
CZARA implementation has been slow because
states objected to EPA’s initial broad prescriptive
approach, resulting in more specific management




Table 1provides a taxonomy of policy instruments
that could be used to ameliorate agricultural re-
source and environmental problems. Three broad
groupings organize the instruments: involuntary
measures that are, to varying degrees, coercive;
voluntary measures providing varying amounts of
financial incentive; and facilitative measures that
rely primarily on information. Involuntary pro-98 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Matrix of Federal Agricultural Conservation/Environmental Policy Instruments
and Problems
Characterizing
Continuua Conservation/Environmental Policy Instruments
Participation Involuntary Voluntary Facilitative
Motivation Regulatory Economic Incentives Moral Suasion
Conservation/ Trading/ Education/
Environmental Conservation Pigouvian Land cost Incentive Banking/ Technical
Problem Regulation Compliance Taxes Retirement Sharing Payments Bonding Assistance
Erosion: soil sodbuster/ Soil Bank ACP CTA (1936)
productivity y compliance (1956) (1936)
(1985) CRP
(1985)
Erosion: CZARA sodbusterl CRP ACP WQIP CTA (1936)
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CZARA—Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments
EQIP—Environmental Quality Improvement Program
grams are arrayed from left to right in order of
decreasing specificity of program requirements. In
other words, the more closely prescribed the pro-
ducer actions, the farther left a particular instru-
ment falls on the continuum, Voluntary measures
are similarly ranked from left to right, as the level
of financial incentive provided decreases. The evo-
lution of environmental concerns discussed above
is echoed in the rows of the matrix, with the initial
concerns about soil productivity losses from ero-
sion occurring in the top rows, and more recent
concerns appearing in the bottom rows. The ap-
ESA—Endangered Species Act
EWRP—Emergency Wetland Reserve Program
FIFRA—Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
WHIP—Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program
WQIP—Water Quality Improvement Program
WRP—Wetland Reserve Program.
proximate dates of specific policies are indicated in
the body of the matrix, changing where new prob-
lems were encompassed by older policies,
Involuntary measures have not been widely used
in agriculture but have begun to emerge in the past
decade. We place three instruments in this group—
direct controls, Pigouvian taxes, and the conserva-
tion compliance instruments first enacted in the
Food Security Act of 1985 (conservation compli-
ance, sodbuster, and swampbuster). Direct controls
include pesticide regulation, the wetland dredge
and fill permit review requirements of Section 404Heimlich and Claassen Agricultural Policy at a Crossroads 99
of the Clean Water Act, and the agricultural non-
point source pollution provisions of CZARA. The
cells representing Pigouvian taxes in table 1 are
blank because this instrument is not currently used
in agricultural conservation and environmental
programs, even in the weak form of a general tax
on agricultural inputs or outputs.
The conservation compliance mechanisms defy
conventional economic classification schemes:
they are not taxes, subsidies, or regulations, but
they have some of the characteristics of each. Ar-
guably, they can be viewed as conditions on par-
ticipation in voluntary subsidy payment programs
and thus voluntary in nature. However, we catego-
rize them as involuntary because most of the pay-
ments that could be withheld are income or price
support benefits associated with commodity pro-
grams that are, rightly or wrongly, viewed as en-
titlements by farm operators. Because of the long
history and entitlement nature of these programs,
their value is capitalized into land values (Barnard
et al. 1997; Duffy et al. 1994) and generally built
into producers’ financial calculations. These pro-
grams are voluntary in the same sense that produc-
ers’ decisions are voluntary under a Pigouvian tax:
producers are always free to pay the full penalty
(or tax) instead of improving environmental per-
formance.
More specifically, conservation compliance ex-
hibits characteristics of both direct controls and
taxes. Baumol and Oates provide distinctions be-
tween direct controls and taxes or fees that provide
useful insight regarding these instruments:
a directcontrolmustinvolvea directiveto individual
decisionmakers requiringthem to set one or more
outputor inputquantitiesat somespecifiedlevelsor
prohibitingthemfromexceeding(or fallingshortof)
some specified levels. If the activity levels satisfy
theserequirements,they are consideredlegal and no
penalty is imposed.However, if they are violated,
whetherby smallor largeamounts,the individualis
consideredto be a lawbreakerwhois subjectto pun-
ishment.Withtaxesorfeesontheotherhand,evenif
they are basedon standardsfor the communityas a
whole,no individualis toldwhatinputor outputlev-
els to select. Moreover, taxes and fees utilize no
knife’s-edge-criterion.The amount of the decision
maker’spaymentwillvarywithhis pertinentactivity
levels,withno imputationof illegalityto the activity
levelshe chooses,(Baumoland Oates 1988,p. 191)
Like direct controls, conservation compliance
prescribes limits on producer actions and provides
for penalties without explicit distinction regarding
the size of the violation. Like taxes and fees, how-
ever, violation does not imply illegal activity, and
the prospective penalties are limited and known in
advance. In essence, these programs share features
of environmental tax and regulatory programs but
bear little resemblance to environmental subsidy
programs. For example, producers are not provided
a subsidy because they do not drain wetlands; they
are assessed a penalty if wetlands are drained in
violation of swampbuster provisions.
Explicitly voluntary programs include land re-
tirement, cost sharing, incentive payments, emis-
sions trading, and conservation technical assis-
tance. Long-term land retirement programs gener-
ally provide conservation, environmental, and
commodity supply management benefits. Since
1990, for example, the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram (CRP) has increasingly incorporated water
quality, air quality, and wildlife habitat consider-
ations into bid acceptance rules. The CRP’s Envi-
ronmental Benefits Index (EBI) proxies for spatial
variation in the contribution that retiring different
parcels of land makes to achieving environmental
goals (e.g., the closer land is to water, ceteris pari-
bus, the higher its water quality score). The point
values assigned to each part of the EBI (e.g., water
quality, air quality, soil productivity, etc.) weight
the multiple objectives of the program.
Emission trading is a difficult case to reflect in
table 1. From agriculture’s viewpoint, trading is a
voluntary measure offering economic incentives
because farmers are under no compulsion to par-
ticipate and receive cost-sharing and incentive pay-
ments from point source dischargers. However,
from the perspective of point source dischargers,
trading remains an involuntary, regulatory policy
that is only somewhat mitigated by the flexibility
to subsidize nonpoint source control adoption at
lower cost than prescribed point source controls.
Conservation at a Crossroads?
Our brief history of the evolution of programs and
the policy instruments matrix highlight three points
of relative constancy in policy since the 1930s.
Despite significant changes in the 1985 and 1990
farm bills, (1) farm income and distributional im-
pacts continued to be important considerations in
agricultural policy of any kind, (2) conservation
and environmental policies continued to be closely
tied to commodity policy, and (3) the range of
policy mechanisms that were widely used to com-
bat resource and environmental problems associ-
ated with agriculture has been limited. However,
developments in commodity and other policies in
recent years suggest that these constants are under
strain. The policy taxonomy presented in the pre-
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objectives and mechanisms. Several recent devel-
opments may force continued change, placing ag-
ricultural conservation and environmental policy at
a crossroads.
The most fundamental change occurred in the
1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Re-
form (FAIR) Act. FAIR decouples income support
payments from production and from prices, Decou-
pling payments from production eliminates the
need to maintain land in crop production to receive
payments while providing leverage for sodbuster
and swampbuster policies that operate at the ex-
tensive margin. A potential beneficial environmen-
tal consequence is the cyclical retirement of some
land that is both economically and environmentally
sensitive when market prices drop (Heimlich
1989). Price decoupling means that incentives for
conservation compliance, sodbuster, and swarnp-
buster provisions are improved: FAIR Act pay-
ments do not decline when prices rise, creating a
more temporally consistent disincentive. In addi-
tion, program participation carries no opportunity
cost in terms of acreage set aside, which has re-
sulted in high participation and, perhaps, wider ad-
herence to conservation compliance, sodbuster,
and swampbuster provisions.
Price decoupling also increases the divergence
of economic interests between producers who are
directly affected by environmental restrictions and
those who are not. Under a regulatory program
with decoupling, for example, producers who farm
land where little or no abatement is reauired would
benefit from the price effect of reduce~ supply due
to the increase in production costs for abatement
on other farms. Under the deficiency payment pro-
grams of the past, however, agricultural producers
had little incentive to support environmental regu-
lation even if they would not be required to under-
take abatement actions, despite relatively inelastic
demand for agricultural commodities (Lichtenberg
and Zilberman 1986). So long as target prices ex-
ceeded market prices, deficiency payments made
up the difference between the target price and mar-
ket price, and producers’ market gains due to en-
vironmental restriction would be offset (at least
partially) by reductions in deficiency payments.
Decoupling income support payments from market
prices under the FAIR Act exposes producers to
price fluctuations, allowing them to benefit from
price increases due to environmental regulation.
For example, restricting or discouraging the con-
version of wetlands for crop production reduces
potential profit for producers who could otherwise
convert wetland to crop production, but results in
lower supplies and higher overall commodity
prices (Claassen, Heimlich, and House 1997; He-
imlich et al. 1997). That is, farmers who do not
have wetlands to convert benefit from having re-
strictions imposed on farmers with wetlands that
could otherwise increase commodity supplies and
decrease market prices.
Exactly how this potential for new distributional
impacts will affect agricultural policy decisions is
unclear. Decoupling and the increasing importance
of environmental considerations in agricultural
policy could alter the political calculus of income
redistribution by making the nature of the resource
base an additional consideration.
A second factor for change is uncertainty about
the future of farm income support payments. End-
ing direct income support to agricultural producers,
as has been suggested by the FAIR Act’s Congres-
sional sponsors, would eliminate most of the eco-
nomic leverage for conservation compliance pro-
grams. Other payments and benefits could still be
withheld, but income support payments amount to
the largest part of producer subsidies in agriculture.
The end of these payments would pose at least two
policy questions.
The first question is whether policymakers are
willing to impose the costs of environmental com-
pliance on producers through direct regulation,
without offsetting income support payments,
CZARA is the first instance of direct regulation of
agricultural nonpoint source environmental prob-
lems (Heimlich and Barnard 1995). Given the 1995
change in control of Congress, however, CZARA
may represent the end of a trend that began in the
early 1970s, rather than the beginning of a new
regulatory trend. If CZARA is a harbinger of new
agricultural regulation, current program implemen-
tation may offer clues to potential future regulatory
programs. Specifically, within broad federal guide-
lines and goals, regulations would likely be devel-
oped by states, with heavy input from the agricul-
tural community. Regulatory programs are likely
to be graduated responses to environmental prob-
lems that initially pay careful attention to the eco-
nomic feasibility of required measures, moving to
more extreme measures only when areawide envi-
ronmental performance goals are not achieved.
The second policy question raised by the poten-
tial end of commodity programs is whether Con-
gress would fund environmental programs even if
it does not fund income support. This option may
be preferable to the “polluter pays” principle em-
bodied in environmental policy for most other sec-
tors dominated by point source pollution. How-
ever, the availability of significant funding for ex-
clusively environmental programs has yet to be
demonstrated, Congress was willing to impose
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come support payments and to spend money on
long-term land retirement. It is not clear, however,
that Congress is symmetrically willing to appropri-
ate sufficient funds for direct subsidies to improve
environmental performance when the supply con-
trol benefits of land retirement are not needed and
when there is no commodity support program to
leverage conservation compliance. Consolidation
of previous programs (ACP, GPCP, CTA, etc.)
into the Environmental Quality Improvement Pro-
gram (EQIP) has come at reduced funding levels,
although livestock waste problems were an excep-
tion. Cost-share and technical assistance funding
for programs consolidated in EQIP averaged $966
million per year (1992 constant dollars) in the
1983–92 period, while total EQIP funding for
1997-2002 is $200 million per year, of which half
is earmarked for livestock waste problems.
Regardless of preferences for kinds of conser-
vation programs, federal deficit reduction efforts to
reduce government spending may have been the
most im~ortant motivation in the decision to de-
couple income support from current commodity
production (Paarlburg and Orden 1996; Jagger and
Hull 1997). Agricultural subsidies were a very vis-
ible half of all federal direct subsidies and one-
third of all credit program outlays in 1995. The
FAIR Act brought predictability to a previously
stochastic budget element that was largely out of
Congress’s year-to-year control, but the level of
payments has also been an issue, That level mayor
may not be reduced by redirection away from com-
modity programs to environmental and conserva-
tion goals.
A third factor is that the range of environmental
and conservation problems confronting agriculture
has expanded, putting more diverse and novel pres-
sures on conservation policy. Hypoxia (oxygen de-
ficiency) in a large “dead zone” of the Gulf of
Mexico and blooms of alarmingly predatory pfies-
teria piscicida organisms in Albemarle Sound and
the Chesapeake Bay have been added to better-
understood nonpoint source water quaiity prob-
lems (Satchell 1997; Boesch et al. 1997; Atwood et
al, 1994; Rabalais, Turner, and Wiseman 1995).
Agroindustrial issues such as intensification of
livestock enterprises, food safety concerns with
new or resistant bacteria, and the framework of
phytosanitary issues permitted under GATT have
emerged (Hoban et al. 1997; McBride 1997; Long
and Painter 1991; Buzby et al. 1996). These new
problems both raise the level of scientific uncer-
tainty and introduce new actors and institutions.
In addition to more diverse environmental
policy problems, pressures for devolution of envi-
ronmental policy show signs of producing a more
diverse set of policy responses to these problems at
different levels of government and geography
(Braden and Matsueda 1997). Federal conservation
and environmental authorities have played facili-
tating or support roles, deferring to strong state
initiatives in the widespread concern about envi-
ronmental problems of livestock concentrations in
North Carolina, New York, and Florida (Pierce and
Ramsey 1997; Chapman and Coombe 1996; Bog-
gess 1994), pjiesteria outbreaks in Maryland and
Virginia (Satchell 1997; Boesch et al. 1997), and
the San Francisco Bay–Sacramento/San Joaquin
Delta water agreement in California (Zilberman et
al. 1994). Whether such strong state and local ini-
tiatives expand and produce increasingly divergent
environmental focii across states, or whether they
are capitalized on and consolidated at the federal
level (following older models of clean air, water,
and coastal management legislation), remains to be
seen.
A final factor putting conservation policy at a
crossroads is enthusiasm for market-based incen-
tives. Limited applications of these instruments to
date include sulfur oxide emissions trading in the
Clean Air Act (Tietenberg 1988), several proposals
for and applications of point-nonpoint source pol-
lution trading (Tippett and Dodd 1995; U.S. EPA
1992), the emergence of wetland mitigation bank-
ing to compensate for permitted wetland conver-
sion (Environmental Law Institute 1993; U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers 1994), proposals for en-
vironmental hazard assurance programs dictated
by wholesalers and retailers, and a host of other
proposals (Malik, Larson, and Ribaudo 1992; Seg-
erson 1990). Although proponents often appeal to
a kind of “smoke and mirrors” quality of getting
environmental improvement at little or no cost,
there is undeniable interest in avoiding expensive
bureaucracies and the necessity for heavy-handed
enforcement action by using market signals to
modify polluters’ behaviors. Often misunderstood,
or deliberately downplayed, is the need for a pre-
existing regulatory framework that provides the in-
centive to reduce environmental problems, using
markets to increase the efficiency with which re-
ductions can be achieved. For example, point-
nonpoint source pollution trading is motivated by
the existing regulation of point sources under the
Clean Water Act. In reality, what market-based
schemes provide is flexibility in efficiently meet-
ing environmental goals, rather than independent
incentives to reduce externalities. Regulation pro-
vides the incentive and motivation, while these
market-based incentives can ameliorate or mitigate
the rigidities that command and control regulatory
policies can introduce.102 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Alternative Future Paths
Faced with these pressures for change in conser-
vation and environmental policies, economists
should consider possible alternative paths along
which policy might evolve in the next century. We
posit three alternative paths: direct regulation; en-
vironmentally based voluntary income support
payments referred to as “green” payments; and
use of market-based instruments. Direct regulation,
which can include both design and performance
standards, is well understood and well analyzed in
the literature (Shortle and Dunn 1986; Sunding
1996). “Green” payment policies are often dis-
cussed but seldom described in detail or analyzed
as policy instruments (Lynch and Smith 1994;
Lynch 1994; Sorensen 1994; Smith 1995). While a
myriad of market-based programs can be imag-
ined, from wetland mitigation banking to complex
environmental hazard insurance schemes, the dis-
cussion here focuses on trading between a regu-
lated point source and unregulated nonpoint
sources (Hahn 1989; Malik, Larson, and Ribaudo
1992; Letson, Crutchfield, and Malik 1993).
We examine how problems of insufficient infor-
mation and the realities of policymakers’ distribu-
tional goals constrain possibilities for policy de-
sign. We also draw out limited conclusions about
the relative efficiencies of the alternative paths.
Insufficient Information
Ideally, all three paths would operate from a simi-
lar base of information about the causes, sources,
and impacts of environmental problems caused by
farming. That is, production practices could be di-
rectly linked to damages. Such information could
guide regulators as to which sources to restrict and
how much to restrict them. Information about eco-
nomic benefits from improvements could form the
basis for “green” payments and could serve as
proxies for prices in marketlike transactions be-
tween point and nonpoint sources of pollution.
Such proxies are needed because, as actually
implemented, a government agency usually acts as
broker between point and nonpoint sources, with
little direct negotiation between the parties. Vari-
ous studies have demonstrated that the value of
such information in environmental regulation out-
weighs the cost of collecting it, but such studies
have been attempted only on a limited geographic
scale (Carpenter and Bosch 1997). As we have
seen above, such detailed information is currently
unavailable on a scale broad enough for environ-
mental policy.
Because we lack sufficient information on envi-
ronmental resource characteristics and relation-
ships, we do not presently understand how to vary
either economic incentives or environmental per-
formance standards over the landscape to achieve
efficient improvements. Because of this constraint,
uniform standards have been, and will likely con-
tinue to be, the norm for a great deal of conserva-
tion and environmental policy. For example, under
sodbuster and swarnpbuster provisions, converting
highly erodible land and wetlands for agricultural
production triggers loss of program benefits, re-
gardless of the particular impacts on water quality
or wildlife habitat. All three potential future paths
are likely to combine uniformity in the standards to
be met with at least some recognition of the varia-
tion in resources by using a plan-based approach
(Ervin and Smith 1996). Trained planners, working
for a state or local conservation authority, would
work with farmers to develop whole farm plans,
which the farmers would then agree to implement
under threat of fines, the incentive of’ ‘green” pay-
ments, or in pollution “trades.”
Distributional Goals
Who pays is not categorically determined by the
selection of policy instruments. While a regulatory
policy may seemingly embody the “polluter pays”
principle, it may actually spread costs among pro-
ducers, consumers, and foreign purchasers of ag-
ricultural commodities. This distribution can occur
because the immediate effect of a regulatory policy
is to impose higher costs on agricultural producers,
creating a Ieftward shift in the supply curves for
agricultural commodities. Because of inelastic de-
mand for agricultural commodities, a significant
portion of costs maybe passed along in the form of
higher prices to consumers and foreign purchasers.
Domestic consumers, in their role as taxpayers,
also fund the technical assistance, monitoring, and
enforcement actions necessary to implement the
policy.
Differential regulatory programs have distribu-
tional effects across sectors of the economy as
well. Pollution abatement and control costs for
nonagricultural sectors have averaged 1.7% to
1.8% of GDP since 1970 (Vegan 1996), Given the
relatively mild regulatory treatment accorded agri-
culture and the voluntary, cost-sharing nature of
most agricultural environmental and conservation
programs, the sector is likely paying a less than
proportionate share and may be receiving a net
subsidy.
In terms of distributional impacts between
farms, the relative effect of a regulatory policy on
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depending on the farm’s environmental sensitivity.
Lichtenberg, Parker, and Zilberman (1988) note
that environmental policies affecting agriculture
may significantly redistribute income among
groups of producers. Claassen, Heimlich, and
House (1997) find that similar redistributive ef-
fects would be expected following a relaxation of
current restrictions on wetland conversion for ag-
ricultural production (i.e., the so-called swamp-
buster provisions and Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act).
In the broader policy framework envisioned
here, the same impacts could occur. Producers who
are not required to take conservation or pollution
control actions would enjoy the price effect with-
out bearing any pollution control costs. The net
aggregate effect on quasi-rents to producers de-
pends on (a) price effects, (b) output effects (net of
reduced costs due to reduced output), and (c) the
change in costs of production for output produced
under the new policy, In aggregate, inelastic de-
mand for agricultural commodities means that net
revenue will increase, but it is not clear that in-
creased revenue will exceed increased costs.
A “green” payment program turns the ‘‘pol-
luter pays” principle on its head because farmers
now produce environmental improvement for a
price established by the federal government as a
joint product with agricultural commodities deter-
mined at market prices. If the marginal cost of
environmental improvement is upward sloping,
producers would earn economic surplus on subsidy
payments, providing some income support. De-
spite some overlap, the distribution of “green”
payments to producers is likely to be significantly
different from the current distribution of income
support payments. Traditional clients of farm pro-
grams (corn and soybean producers on level, well-
drained land in the Corn Belt) may not have sig-
nificant environmental problems, while new
groups of producers (citrus producers in Florida or
large, industrial hog or chicken producers in Ar-
kansas) may become the most important targets for
environmental improvement. Equity concerns,
such as the notion of paying environmental “bad
actors” while more environmentally responsible
producers receive no payments, are also likely to
be issues.
Potential changes in commodity supply with
“green” payments are uncertain. Depending on
how runoff baselines and subsidy rates are estab-
lished, the program could serve mainly to maintain
environmentally sensitive land in production, al-
beit with some additional conservation or pollution
abatement practices, or could actually reduce pro-
duction if land retirement is encouraged. Malik and
Shoemaker (1993) show that, without appropriate
controls, subsidizing agricultural inputs for envi-
ronmental improvement will expand production at
the extensive margin. To prevent the “green” pay-
ment program from subsidizing expansion of crop
production at the extensive margin, land that has
not previously been in agricultural production
would have to be excluded from eligibility for the
subsidy (just as previously unfarmed land was ex-
cluded from the Conservation Reserve Program)
and producers who violate sodbuster or swamp-
buster rules to bring new environmentally sensitive
land into production might have to be ineligible for
payments on any land. On the one hand, if com-
modity supply decreases under a‘ ‘green” payment
program, price increases may ameliorate the dif-
ference in return to producers who farm environ-
mentally sensitive land andthose who do not. On
the other hand, if commodity supplies increase,
price declines would hurt farmers of environmen-
tally benign land, while farmers receiving “green”
payments would be compensated. Consumers (who
are also taxpayers) would pay the full cost of en-
vironmental improvement, plus the associated
rents earned by producers and the costs of imple-
mentation, monitoring, and enforcement. If com-
modity prices decline, some of that expenditure
could be offset, while those costs would be exac-
erbated if prices increase. The fact that government
costs would be high may also be an important lim-
iting factor in actually establishing a <‘green” pay-
ments program.
For producers, distributional impacts from a sys-
tem of point-nonpoint source trading fall some-
where between regulation and “green” payments.
Unlike regulation, under trading producers would
be compensated for costs incurred from the pro-
ceeds of selling their pollution rights. Unlike
“green” payments, market transactions in a trad-
ing scheme would likely limit the economic sur-
plus that producers can gain because the price paid
for pollution reductions will be driven by market
forces to the marginal cost. Consumers and tax-
payers would be exposed to some administrative
costs, but these costs would likely be less than
those for a regulatory program for agricultural pro-
ducers. The change in commodity supply due to
market-based trading is also unclear. Environmen-
tal improvement is usually achieved at some cost
to producers either by reducing output (e.g., land
retirement or strip cropping) or by reducing envi-
ronmental consequences without significantly re-
ducing output (e.g., filter strips). Technical change
that reduces either polluting inputs per unit of out-
put or environmental impacts without reducing
output may be economically attractive. Abler and104 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Shortle (1995), based on results for static model-
ing, note that factor-augmenting technical change
will reduce production costs and encourage ex-
panded output, casting doubt on the idea that such
change will reduce input use. However, technical
change that produces cost-effective, environmen-
tally benign substitutes for environmentally dam-
aging inputs would have an unambiguously posi-
tive environmental impact.
A corollary of distributional impacts from envi-
ronmental programs is that there is likely to be a
strong political focus on seemingly technical is-
sues, such as the establishment of baselines from
which subsidized abatement or trades are counted,
and the practices and standards required for pay-
ment. As an example, consider the debates con-
cerning the definition of highly erodible land and
the need to attain tolerable soil erosion (T value)
levels in the relatively well known area of soil
erosion control when conservation compliance re-
quirements were enacted in the 1985 Food Security
Act. Because these parameters are key factors in
determining who pays or who is paid, policymak-
ers concerned with the distribution of costs or ben-
efits from environmental improvement will seek to
understand and control them, Producers who have
already reduced environmental problems (or who
have been producing on land with few problems)
would benefit from baselines stricter than current
levels in the case of a “green” payments program
or trading, and less strict than current levels for a
regulatory program. However, setting standards
too high for “green” payments or trading can be
costly, constrain the trades that can be expected,
limit funds available for real environmental im-
provement, and—in extreme situations—create an
incentive to produce on land with environmental
problems.
Relative Efficiency
When environmental problems can be monitored
or effectively predicted and interrelationships be-
tween farm practices and ultimate environmental
impacts are understood, a Pigouvian tax is superior
in terms of economic efficiency, regardless of
whether policy objectives involve maximizing so-
cial welfare (Shortle and Dunn 1986) or achieving
environmental outcomes at least cost (Baumol and
Oates 1988). The tax provides producer incentives
for actions ranging from adoption of alternative
production technologies (e.g., no-till) to land re-
tirement. Efficiency is achieved because producers
are free to choose (1) the level of environmental
improvement, ensuring that improvement will be
undertaken by those who can achieve it at lower
cost, and (2) their own strategy for achieving those
improvements, ensuring that it is achieved at least
cost.
Regulation is generally less efficient because it
does not allow producers to choose the level of
environmental improvement they are required to
achieve, Indirect policies that apply to specific in-
puts (e.g., a tax on nitrogen fertilizer) or require
specific practices (e.g., land retirement) are gener-
ally less efficient than a Pigouvian tax because
they provide incentive only for a restricted range of
abatement actions that may be less efficient,
In the real world of insufficient information
about environmental problems, the relative effi-
ciency of alternative policy instruments is unclear.
For example, when runoff can be reasonably pre-
dicted but fate and transport are not well under-
stood, runoff standards or economic incentives
may be uniformly imposed, However, without
knowledge of transport coefficients, the relative
efficiency of uniform standards is unknown. Using
a simple model, Russell (1986) showed that when
sources that contribute a larger share to ambient
pollution also have high pollution abatement costs,
relative efficiency is an empirical question. It can
be more efficient to impose a uniform percentage
reduction in emissions on all firms rather than im-
posing a uniform fee on emissions, because of the
high fees necessary to induce the level of control
required to meet ambient pollution standards.
Miltz, Braden, and Johnson (1988) estimate the
relative efficiency of an erosion fee and a uniform
erosion standard (based on T values) for various
levels of erosion reduction in a small watershed in
Illinois. They find that erosion charges are more
efficient when erosion reduction targets are be-
tween 2T and 5T, but that uniform erosion stan-
dards minimize control costs when the standard is
set at T. Carpenter and Bosch (1997) show that
such disaggregated empirical analysis can actually
be done, albeit on a limited geographical scale, and
that the value of the information exceeds the cost
of collecting it.
It is likely that similar, detailed empirical analy-
ses will be necessary to determine the relative ef-
ficiency of direct regulations, “green” payment
subsidies, and point-nonpoint source trading or
other market-based instruments where transfer co-
efficients are not known and policies are applied
uniformly. “Green” payments, trading, and Pigou-
vian taxes tend to direct environmental control to
low-cost sites. Efficiency is improved to the extent
that these sites also contribute substantially to en-
vironmental problems, but there is no bargain if
more expensive sites actually produce greater mar-
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per dollar spent. Differences between low marginal
costs of source control and low marginal costs of
damage reduction are directly related to the trans-
formation of pollutants across time and space (fate
and transport), about which regttiators and produc-
ers alike have very little knowledge.
Conclusions
As we enter the twenty-first century, agricultural
conservation and environmental policy stands at a
crossroads. While environmental protection is be-
coming increasingly important in agricultural
policy decisions, the future of commodity policy is
uncertain. Yet farm income and the distributional
impacts of policies are likely to remain important
considerations in making environmental policy re-
lated to agriculture. Although economists view
economic efficiency as the primary goal of envi-
ronmental policy because it can lower the the over-
all cost of environmental protection, policymakers
may favor relatively inefficient policies on the ba-
sis of income and distributional impacts. Given the
limited information on the physical processes of
agricultural environmental problems, it will not al-
ways be clear, a priori, which policy alternative is
relatively efficient.
Can agricultural policy meet multiple environ-
mental objectives while satisfying demands for
farm sector income maintenance and reducing gov-
ernment costs? Will these goals be consistent with
increasing the overall efficiency of environmental
policy in agriculture? Without a clear understand-
ing of the preferences of policymakers for the eco-
nomic interests of particular groups, balancing the
federal budget, and environmental protection, it is
impossible for economists to answer these ques-
tions definitively.
What economists can do is to conduct the de-
tailed studies necessary to determine the reIative
distributional and efficiency consequences of vari-
ous policy instruments. We have argued that,
within the current commodity policy framework
and under realistic assumptions about information,
these questions are more empirical than theoretical,
depending critically on observable differences in
resource conditions. WhiIe there have been a few
suggestive studies addressing these issues in local-
ized contexts, a great deal more work will be
needed to extend these models across the geo-
graphic scope necessary to estimate industry-level
changes that are critical to understanding the dis-
tributional consequences of national environmental
policies.
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